In a comment, Xu, Curty, Qi, Qian, and Lo claimed that discrete-variable (DV) measurement device independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD) would compete with its continuousvariable (CV) counterpart at metropolitan distances. Actually, Xu et al.'s analysis supports exactly the opposite by showing that the experimental rate of our CV protocol (achieved with practical room-temperature devices) remains one order of magnitude higher than their purely-numerical and over-optimistic extrapolation for qubits, based on nearly-ideal parameters and cryogenic detectors (unsuitable solutions for a realistic metropolitan network, which is expected to run on cheap roomtemperature devices, potentially even mobile). The experimental rate of our protocol (expressed as bits per relay use) is confirmed to be two-three orders of magnitude higher than the rate of any realistic simulation of practical DV-MDI-QKD over short-medium distances. Of course this does not mean that DV-MDI-QKD networks should not be investigated or built, but increasing their rate is a non-trivial practical problem clearly beyond the analysis of Xu et al. Finally, in order to clarify the facts, we also refute a series of incorrect arguments against CV-MDI-QKD and, more generally, CV-QKD, which were made by Xu et al. with the goal of supporting their thesis.
In a recent comment [1] , Xu et al. claimed that discrete variable (DV) measurement device independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD) [2] [3] [4] was unfairly compared to a novel high-rate continuous variable (CV) protocol [5] . Here we show that this claim is false and we fully clarify this DV-CV comparison. However, before going into the details of this comparison, we need to rectify a series of incorrect and misleading statements made by these authors against CV-MDI-QKD and, more generally CV-QKD, with the aim of supporting their thesis.
Features of CV-MDI-QKD
First of all, contrary to the claims of Xu et al. [1] , the CV experiment of [5] is performed with cheap roomtemperature components (optical modulators and homodyne detectors) in a regime of parameters which are easily achievable in practice. Modulations of ϕ ≃ 60 shot noise units are relatively low with respect to what is achievable (100 and more). Reconciliation efficiencies of ξ ≃ 97% are currently state-of-the-art in CV-QKD experiments [14] [15] [16] . An experimental excess noise ε ≃ 0.01 is not low but typical, fully comparable with the values reported in the fibre-optic experiment of [17] , where the experimental excess noise was estimated to be ε ≃ 0.001 at 10 8 data points and ε ≃ 0.008 at 10 6 data points, for Bob's detection at 53 km. At lower distances 25 km (as is in our case), the excess noise is expected to be smaller, which means that our experimental value ε ≃ 0.01 can even be considered relatively high. The robustness of CV-MDI-QKD against excess noise can also be appreciated from the analysis done in the Supplementary Section IE6 of [5] (in particular, see Fig. 5 there), where the security thresholds are proven to be robust against much higher excess noise (ε = 0.1).
Then, Xu et al. [1] completely missed an important advantage of CV-MDI-QKD, which is the extremely good performance of CV detection performed at the relay. This crucial feature relies on two basic facts:
(1) The detection setup of CV-MDI-QKD is completely different from that of one-way CV-QKD protocols.
(2) CV Bell detection is deterministic and highly efficient (also in telecom setups).
Let us explain these points in detail and the reader may also refer to the panels in Fig. 1 . In one-way (or point-to-point) CV-QKD protocols (see Fig. 1a ), Alice prepares outgoing quantum states while Bob detects states incoming from the channel. Because of this configuration, only the loss within Alice's station can be trusted and, therefore, neglected by re-scaling the signal level at the output of Alice's box. The loss within Bob's station cannot be re-scaled since it is added on top of channel loss and noise (any re-scaling will also amplify the loss and noise of the channel, without any signal-tonoise advantage). For this reason, Bob's overall quantum efficiency is limited and this clearly affects fibre-optic implementations at telecom wavelengths. For instance, a quantum efficiency of 60% was reported in Ref. [17] due to optical manipulations and photo-detection (however, note that this specific value of 60% can be improved and, therefore, should not be considered as a fundamental limit for the detection in one-way CV-QKD protocols).
By contrast, in the setup of CV-MDI-QKD depicted in . a, One-way CV-QKD protocol with limited efficiency within Bob's station, due to unscalable loss. b, Proof-of-principle demonstration of CV-MDI-QKD [5] in free-space at optical/infrared regime (1064 nm) with ≃ 98% efficiency for the CV Bell detection. c, Proposal for a fibre-optic telecom implementation of CV-MDI-QKD, where fibre-outcoupling and free-space CV Bell detection achieve ≃ 95% efficiency.
states in their private stations, where loss and noise are trusted. For this reason, both the signal levels of Alice and Bob can be set at the output of their stations, so that the effect of the internal losses can be completely neglected. Untrusted loss and noise will only affect the channels and the detection at the relay. The latter has extremely high efficiencies, indeed η d ≃ 98% in our freespace experiment at optical wavelengths (1064 nm).
Here it is worth remarking that the CV version of Bell detection can be done deterministically with simple linear optics and photodetection [18] , contrarily to the 25% probability success affecting DV-MDI-QKD and the typical 50% value bounding teleportation experiments with photonic qubits [18] [19] [20] [21] . Most importantly, the quantum efficiency of the homodyne detectors in CV Bell detections is extremely high. Contrary to the incorrect claims of Xu et al. [1] , homodyne detectors with high efficiencies have been seen in both optical and telecom setups:
[Optical Setups] These include the various free-space CV teleportation experiments [18] , but also fibrebased experiments, such as Ref. [8, 9] , where coupling efficiency to a fibre can be as high as 98−99% and the quantum efficiency of photo-detectors can be > 99%, with an overall efficiency of about 97 − 98% [10] .
[Telecom Setups] For instance, see Ref. [11] , where the performance of a balanced homodyne detection at 1550 nm is 98%, by means of InGaAs PIN diodes with an active area of 500 µm in diameter and a quantum efficiency of ∼ 99%, together with a fringe visibility of 99.5% at the beamsplitter. See also Ref. [12] , where the overall efficiency of the balanced homodyne detector at 1550 nm is 95%. This is performed in free space at the output of a 10 m fibre, and the total 95% efficiency includes both fibre in-coupling (the largest source of loss) and outcoupling (estimated to be 0.1%) [13] .
A simple fibre-optic implementation of CV-MDI-QKD at telecom wavelengths can be done as shown in Fig. 1c . Here the loss within Alice's and Bob's stations (e.g., associated with fibre connections and modulators) can all be re-scaled as trusted loss. At the relay, the CV Bell detection can be done in free space. The efficiency associated with fibre out-coupling is close to 100% if the fibre facet is anti-reflection coated. The efficient of the subsequent CV Bell detection is basically determined by the homodyne detectors which may have 98% efficiency at 1550 nm [11] . For instance, the CV Bell detection can be done in the simplified setup of Ref. [5] involving a balanced beam-splitter and two photodectors. Considering 0.2 dB insertion loss for the beam splitter and 99% efficiency for the diodes [11] , one realizes a CV Bell detection with ≃ 95% efficiency. This means that the performance of our proof-of-principle experiment can be achieved in a future fibre-optic telecom implementation, contrary to the conjectures made by Xu et al. [1] where the protocol was analysed by assuming too low efficiencies for the detection at the relay (down to 85%).
Unfortunately, yet other claims made by Xu et al. [1] were wrong. Contrarily to what they state:
(i) The asymptotic rate of [5] is not an upper bound but a lower bound with respect to all possible attacks. In fact, the experimental rate is computed from Alice and Bob's shared classical data assuming the whole environment belongs to Eve. Then, the theoretical rate is derived against optimal attacks. More precisely, this is minimized over all two-mode Gaussian attacks in normal form after the application of the de Finetti theorem and the extremality of Gaussian states [16] . This is in contrast with the partial (and purely numerical) anal-yses in [22, 23] which only considered the simple case of two independent entangling cloner attacks, as thoroughly discussed in Ref. [24] . More details may be found in [25] .
(ii) Finite-size effects against coherent attacks [14] [15] [16] and composable security in the presence of collective attacks [26] support our results. It is true that our theoretical rate is derived in the asymptotic limit of infinite signals but there is no evidence that it would be sensibly affected by finite-size analyses. In fact, the current finite-size analyses tend to the asymptotic limit for blocks of 10 8 data points (e.g., see Fig. 1 of [26] ), which is the size considered in our experiment [5] . This is also the size of data blocks considered in the experiment of Ref. [17] , where the finite-size key rate is shown to well-approximate the asymptotic regime, especially below 30 km, as is clear from Fig. 2 of [17] . Note that (point-to-point) coherent-state protocols are composable-secure against general coherent attacks, but the present proof techniques are not sufficient to prove fast convergence [27, 28] . The fact that a proof is currently missing does not mean that such convergence cannot be shown with another method, i.e., there is no fundamental reason to conjecture that the composablesecure key rates of coherent-based CV-QKD protocols should not fastly converge to the asymptotic values. Indeed this fast convergence has been already proven in the most general case for squeezed-state CV-QKD [28] . By contrast, we note that finite-size analysis seems to be very demanding for DV-MDI-QKD, where blocks of 10 10 data points are needed for achieving reasonably non-zero rates with practical detectors (see Fig. 4 of [29] ).
(iii) The relay doesn't need to be in Alice's lab. In fact, all configurations (symmetric or asymmetric) show a non-trivial advantage with respect to DV-MDI-QKD at metropolitan distances (5 − 25km).
(iv) The use of a single local oscillator is not a major security flaw in CV-QKD and its removal is no longer an experimental challenge. The use of a single local oscillator is typical in all CV-QKD implementations so far. Practical security against its potential manipulation can be achieved if one implements an accurate real-time measurement of the experimental shot noise [28, 30] . Furthermore, CV-QKD can also be implemented using two independent local oscillators followed by classical post-processing [31] [32] [33] . Thus, the "source requirements" brought up by Xu et al. (Appendix D of [1] ) are easily overcome. Regarding this issue of using a single laser, it is important to remark that Xu et al.'s comment [1] is not just against CV-MDI-QKD but the entire field of CV-QKD. According to Xu et al.'s 'criteria', all CV-QKD protocols implemented so far, including the first ground-breaking table-top experiment of Ref. [34] and the long-distance experiment of Ref. [17] wouldn't be, as they put it, "properly designed QKD demonstrations" for their use of a single local oscillator.
(v) Fast homodyne detectors exist plus CVs remain superior even on slower clocks. In the optical range, homodyne detection can be done at GHzbandwidths [35] , with 80MHz detectors being available with efficiencies 86% [36] and, more recently, 100MHz detectors at 99% efficiency [37] . This is a technology which has large room of development at telecom wavelengths, where a field implementation of CV-QKD has been already achieved at 1MHz clock [17] . This scenario has to be compared with the 75MHz clock rate implemented in DV-MDI-QKD [38] , while 1GHz has only been used for point-to-point BB84, with detector efficiencies of about 20% [39] (now increasable up to 55% [40] ). Here it is important to note that the difference, in terms of bits per use, can be so large that CVs may achieve higher rates than DVs while using much slower clocks. For instance, in the case of point-to-point QKD, a 50MHz-clock CV protocol is already sufficient to outperform a 1GHz-clock protocol with DVs at metropolitan distances [15] . Since there are about three orders-of-magnitude in the rate (bits per use) between practical CV-MDI-QKD and practical DV-MDI-QKD, the CV protocol could run on clocks which are three orders-of-magnitude slower and still achieve the same performances of DVs. For this reason, a fibre-based telecom implementation of CV-MDI-QKD at 1 MHz is hard to beat by any practical implementation of DV-MDI-QKD (see below for a full clarification of the word "practical" in this context).
Actual comparison between CVs and DVs
Having refuted the various incorrect claims and conjectures made by Xu et al. regarding CVs, we now perfom a detailed comparison between CVs and DVs, considering a realistic analysis of DV-MDI-QKD. We can easily see that practical parameters and cheap components for DVs are certainly not those stated in Xu et al.'s comment [1] but those considered by four of these same authors in an earlier paper on "practical aspects" of DV-MDI-QKD [41] . Practical DV-MDI-QKD involves standard single-photon detectors with η d ≃ 14.5% efficiency and a Y 0 ≃ 6×10 −6 dark count rate, together with typical values of the intrinsic error rate e d ≃ 1.5% and error correction efficiency parameter f e = 1.16 [42] . This is stateof-the-art for room-temperature (20 • C) or thermoelectrically cooled (-50
• C) semiconductor (InGaAs) avalanche photodiodes (APD) detectors [43, 44] , typically operating at 10−30% efficiency but with increasing dark counts (see Fig. 2 of [43] ).
Assuming these realistic and practical parameters, one can easily compute an estimate of the rate for DVs by assuming infinite decoy states, neglecting finite-size effects and other errors such as time-jitter and mode mismatch (see Appendix for details). From Fig. 2 we see how the rate of the practical DV-MDI-QKD is below that of the practical CV-MDI-QKD by 3−4 orders-of-magnitude over metropolitan distances, from 6km in the symmetric case up to 25km in the most asymmetric configuration. 
(1) [47, 48] and upperbounded by [49] . b, as in a but with a 100m-fibre between Alice and the relay. c, as in a but with 1km-fibre between Alice and the relay. d, symmetric case where Alice and Bob are equidistant (in simulated fibre) from the relay; no experimental data for this specific configuration.
It is interesting to study the maximum rate that one can achieve with DVs by using semiconductor detectors. Since we are interested in short to medium distances and high rates, the choice is for detectors with the highest efficiency (despite their high dark counts). The best solution appears to be the very recent InGaAs/InP APDs operated in optimized self-differencing mode at room temperature by Toshiba [40] . These achieve η d ≃ 55% efficiency with background rates Y 0 ≃ 5 × 10 −4 at 20 • C. Fixing f e = 1.16 and considering e d in the range 0.1% − 1.5% we can estimate the optimal performance of realistic DV-MDI-QKD in the lower gray band shown in Fig. 2 . As we see from the figure, the optimal DV-MDI-QKD with semiconductor detectors is very good but still between 2 and 3 orders of magnitude below the already experimentally achieved CV rate over typical metropolitan ranges.
In their comment, Xu et al. [1] compared our practical CV experiment with a purely-theoretical numerical extrapolation for DVs, which is based on nearly-ideal parameters and devices. In particular, they consider an extremely-low intrinsic error rate e d ≃ 0.1% [38] (which would be very demanding to realise with real-time modulators in a scalable practical network) and the most advanced superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs). These detectors operate below 2K with η d ≃ 93% efficiency and a Y 0 ≃ 6 × 10 −6 background rate [45] . It is interesting to note that two of the authors of Xu et al. [1] seem to be aware of the limitations of the applicability of these SNSPDs to a real practical scenario, as they openly admitted in a previous publication:
"The main drawback of these novel SNSPDs, however, is their operating temperature, which is currently of the order of 0. It is evident that such an ideal and cryogenic version of DV-MDI-QKD is too demanding for the realistic con-struction of a scalable network (more details may be found in [46] ). Remarkably, even considering these overoptimistic parameters, our practical CV protocol is still ≃ 1 order-of-magnitude better than this ideal extrapolation with DVs in all the configurations of Fig. 2 .
Furthermore, one can easily verify that the DV rate collapses down by another 1 − 2 orders-of-magnitude by employing more standard SNSPDs with η d 45% [38] . By contrast, slight improvements in the reconciliation efficiency of classical protocols of error correction and privacy amplifications may provide further non-trivial gains for CVs. As we see in Fig. 2 , the CV theoretical rates with ideal reconciliation (ξ = 100%) is very close to the secret-key capacity of the total Alice-Bob channel [5] , achievable by CV-QKD protocols.
That being said, our analysis here does not want to discourage the implementation of DV-MDI-QKD at metropolitan distances. While Xu et al.'s cryogenic version of DV-MDI-QKD does not seem to be suitable for building a realistic and low-cost metropolitan network, an implementation of DV-MDI-QKD with room-temperature (or slightly-cooled) semiconductorbased single-photon detectors is not only realistic but appealing, and may be the basis of a secure quantum network with intermediate rates. We therefore strongly encourage serious and careful research in this direction. It would also be interesting to explore potential hybrid DV-CV approaches, as it is now happening for other quantum protocols (e.g., see quantum teleportation [18] ).
In conclusion, our take-home message is the following: DV-MDI-QKD is very good for long distances [38, 50, 51] , but its rate struggles to be increased at various distances, thus motivating the proposal of alternate strategies by the community [52] . By contrast, CV-MDI-QKD [5, 24] struggles with long distances but can potentially provide much higher rates at the metropolitan range (5 − 25km), extending what happens for point-topoint CV-QKD [15, 57] . This statement must not come as a surprise since CV systems are fragile to loss (limiting distance) but they can encode a lot of information thanks to their theoretically infinite-dimensional Hilbert space [16] . Furthermore, besides the use of cheap and practical devices, CVs can easily go broadband.
possible to derive a simple closed formula in terms of all the parameters describing Alice and Bob's shared state (in particular, their first-and second-order moments in the Gaussian case). The next step is therefore to find a lower bound to the key rate by minimizing over all the degrees of freedom associated with Eve's dilation once a small set of accessible parameters has been fixed in Alice and Bob's shared state (by "accessible" we mean always computable from Alice and Bob's shared data). In CV-MDI-QKD, this small set is given by the transmissivities of the two links and the overall excess noise (easily computable from the shared data). By fixing these parameters, one has to optimize Eve's attack over all the remaining degrees of freedom, including the parameters describing the potential correlations between Eve's ancillary modes. Thus, it is clear that just assuming the simple Markovian case of two entangling cloners (i.e., absence of correlations) is a great limitation for Eve and such strong hypothesis cannot provide an unconditionally-secure key rate.
where
] is the probability that Alice and Bob emit a single photon, with µ A (µ B ) being the intensity of Alice's (Bob's) signal; Y 11 Z is the yield in the Z-basis and e 11 X is the error rate in the X-basis, assuming that the parties send singlephoton states; Q Z and E Z are, respectively, the gain and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the Z basis; f e is the error correction inefficiency, and H 2 (x) = −x log 2 x − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x) is the Shannon entropy.
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Z , e 11 X , Q Z and E Z , can be simulated assuming a series of conditions, which further qualify the result to be an upper bound of the actual rate. These include the modeling of the intrinsic error e d by means of two unitaries at the input of the beam splitter at the relay station [41] . Considering single-photon detectors with efficiency η d and dark count rate Y 0 , one may write [1, 41] 
2 ,
Z , and η A (η B ) is the transmissivity of Alice's (Bob's) link with the relay. Then, one may write
where Ω 1 and Ω 2 are given in Eqs. (A4) and (A5) of [1] . Assuming various choices for the basic parameters η d , Y 0 and e d , (with f e = 1.16 [42] ), we maximize R DV-MDI over the intensities µ A and µ B , deriving the simulated theoretical rates shown in Fig. 2 of the main text.
Secret-key rate of CV-MDI-QKD
The security proof of CV-MDI-QKD needs a dedicated discussion for infinite-dimensional systems which involves various elements, including the "de Finettization" of the classical data and the extremality of Gaussian states (see [5] for details). From Alice's amplitudes α, Bob's amplitudes β and the relay outcomes γ, we can derive a joint classical probability p(α, β, γ) which identifies a conditional "post-relay" state ρ ab|γ shared by Alice and Bob in the entanglement-based representation of the protocol. Such a state is then purified into an environment E which is assumed to be fully controlled by Eve. From ρ ab|γ , we can derive both Alice and Bob's mutual information I AB , and Eve's Holevo information χ E (e.g., on Alice's variable α). As a result, we may write the rate as
where ξ is the reconciliation efficiency of the classical codes for error correction and privacy amplification. This is the general method adopted to compute our experimental rate.
In order to derive the theoretical rate, we have to model the most general Gaussian attack against the two channels, which is compatible with observed channel transmissivities, η A and η B . This is done by combining the two lossy channels in the most general way. Since these canonical forms [16] always admit a local (nonStinespring) dilation with a beam splitter and a thermal mode [16] , the two-mode Gaussian attack can be represented by two beam splitters subject to a generallycorrelated two-mode Gaussian state for the environment.
By means of local displacements and symplectic transformations, this state can be reduced to a zero-mean Gaussian state whose covariance matrix is in normal form
where ω A (ω B ) is the thermal noise affecting Alice's (Bob's) link, and parameters g and g ′ describe the correlations between Eve's modes. In these conditions, Alice and Bob's mutual information can be written as I AB = log 2 [(ϕ + 1)χ −1 ], where ϕ is the modulation of the coherent states and χ is the equivalent noise, decomposable as χ = χ loss + ε, with χ loss being the pureloss noise and ε(η A , η B , ω A , ω B , g, g ′ ) the 'excess noise'. For any fixed value of the transmissivities and excess noise, we then optimize Eve's Holevo information over the remaining degrees of freedom, i.e., ω A , ω B , g and g ′ . Thus, we compute a lower bound of the rate, denoted by R ϕ,ξ (η A , η B , ε) [5] . This quantity is asymmetric and decreases more rapidly in η A than in η B . For this reason, we obtain a further lower bound if we replace η A → η A η d , where η d takes into account of the overall efficiency of the CV Bell detection at the relay. This quantity is here used to compute the theoretical rates shown in the main text.
Note that a simple analytical formula can be written in the case of ideal reconciliation ξ = 1 and large modulation ϕ ≫ 1. In this case, we have [5] R(η A , η B , ε) = log 2 2(ηA+ηB )
In the symmetric case η A = η B := η, this rate becomes
.
Secret-key capacity
The total transmissivity of an equivalent point-topoint lossy channel between Alice and Bob is equal to η tot = η A η B . The maximum secret-key rate which is achievable by a CV-QKD protocol is the secret-key capacity K of the channel, satisfying [47] [48] [49] 
Appendix B: Reply to the "Appendix E: Addendum" of Xu et al.
Here we provide an additional reply to Xu et al. who added an appendix to their comment (see the second version available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1506.04819v2). Most of the new comments are just repetitions of the old arguments and have been already replied to in our text above. However, we provide here, and again, a point-topoint rebuttal of these issues, also claryfing other new incorrect statements made by these authors. We apologize with the reader for the repetitions triggered by this process. It is clear that Xu et al. are trying to make all their possible arguments against CV-QKD once they realised they were not able to approach the rate of CV-MDI-QKD. 1 Our reply: No, we do NOT agree with their main point, and we are NOT contradicting our Nature Photonics paper [5] . Xu et al. are clearly mis-quoting us. As already explained before, the rate of CV-MDI-QKD with practical devices and parameters is at least three ordersof-magnitude higher than that of DV-MDI-QKD with corresponding practical devices and parameters [41] . The CV-rate also keeps an advantage of between two and three orders-of-magnitude with respect to the optimal realistic implementation of DV-MDI-QKD with the best available semiconductor single-photon detectors. This advantage is quantified in terms of bits per relay use and evaluated for various values (in dBs) of the channel loss. That being said, the theoretical possibility of using DV-MDI-QKD with cryogenic devices (SNSPDs) currently seems: Unnecessarily complex and very expensive; hard to miniaturise; not extendable to more complex networks (e.g., where each node may act as a user or as a relay); not extendable to mobile devices (which can be hot-spots as well); very fragile with respect to the performances of the SNSPDs, easily losing one-two orders of magnitude from > 90% to < 40% efficiencies. Most importantly, better performances could be achieved with practical implementations of CV-MDI-QKD with cheap and room-temperature devices. Unfortunately, Xu et al. keeps comparing our practical experimental data with the theoretical simulation of a potential cryogenic implementation.
2 Xu et al. claim: "Experimental results of CV-MDI-QKD done in free-space, at a non-telecom wavelength, and using nontelecom detectors cannot and should not be used as a demonstration of telecom CV-MDI-QKD performance." Plus other redundant statements about the use of a single laser etc.
2 Our reply: Despite the fact that ours is a proofof-principle experiment in free space at 1064 nm, it gives a clear indication of the potential performances of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol in a fibrebased telecom-wavelength implementation, where highly efficient homodyne detectors are available at 1550 nm and fibre-couplings are not an issue. This is already fully explained in the main text. In particular, see our points (1) and (2) in the main text, their explanations and Fig. 1 . The use of a single laser is not a major issue as already extensively explained in point (iv) of the main text. Therefore, our experimental results can be used to make quantitative statements about the future performance of a field implementation of CV-MDI-QKD.
3 Xu et al. claim: "CV-MDI-QKD could have an advantage over DV-MDI-QKD only under rather restrictive conditions. We do not deny that CV-MDI-QKD might have an advantage over DV-MDI-QKD, but only in a rather restrictive parameter space where a combination of assumptions/conditions are simultaneously satisfied, namely, (a) asymptotic key rate for an infinitely long key, (b) high-efficiency (well above 85%) homodyne detectors, (c) highly asymmetric configuration where the relay is close to one of the two users, Alice or Bob, (d) low loss (i.e., short distance)." 3 Our reply: This is another claim by these authors which is very easy to disprove. The various points have been already replied to before but, in any case, we can again stress the reasons here.
(a) As already explained in point (ii) of the main text, finite-size effects support our experimental results in the sense that these analyses tend to the asymptotic limit for blocks of 10 8 data points, which is the size considered in our experiment [5] . Despite the fact that the theoretical rate is asymptotic, there is no reason to believe that it would be sensibly affected by finite-size analyses. Here the main argument of Xu et al. is that composability security for coherent-state protocols against coherent attack has not yet proven to converge quickly to the asymptotic analysis. This is mainly a problem of finding the correct proof technique, it cannot be conjectured as a fundamental problem with CVs. As a matter of fact, this problem does not even exist for squeezed-state protocols [28] . By contrast, it is known that larger data blocks ( 10 10 points) are needed for DV-MDI-QKD with practical roomtemperature detectors.
(b) Homodyne detectors have high efficiencies (well above 85%) both at optical and telecom wavelengths, free-space or coupled to fibre. This is typical and already explained above. For instance see the bullet points on page 2 of the main text. The value of 85% of Xu et al. is unreasonably too low. node available to secretly communicate with a remote (authenticated) Bob.
(c) Finally, even assuming the symmetric configuration, Alice and Bob can be separated by a 6 km-long fibre, which is not exactly a short distance at the metropolitan scale.
At the end of their "Addendum" Xu et al. make some "Final remarks". Some of these are completely secondary issues, others are just repetitions of previous points which have been already addressed or refuted, especially the reiterated points on the finite-size effects, the use of a single laser, and the homodyne detectors. We note that Xu et al. misunderstood in which sense our theoretical rate is "optimal", thinking that it would be a sort of upper bound. The optimality is clearly intended as a minimization over all possible attacks which therefore qualifies the key rate as a lower bound -see point (i) of the main text for full details. Thus, what Xu et al. say ("We admit that it was unclear to us whether or not the realistic Gaussian attack considered in [1] to derive the theoretical rate was indeed optimal, or if it provided an upper bound on the theoretical rate. So, in our simulations we opted for the most favourable case for CV-MDI-QKD by considering that the attack is optimal....We are glad to see that Pirandola et al. [23] confirm this.") is not confirmed by us and it is clearly wrong.
